Testimony for Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Robert G. Houdek, on Somalia, Before the House Select Committee on Hunger, January 30, 1992
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for inviting me here today to speak with you about Somalia.
The Present Situation
Somalia is one of the world's most desperate tragedies. Hundreds of thousands of people who have fled the fighting in Mogadishu are in dire need of food and medical care. Tens of thousands, especially the young and the aged, are at risk of dying. Food aid cannot be delivered to Mogadishu because of the fighting and the lack of security for aid workers.
This disaster results from politics. In the year since the fall of former president Siad Barre, Somalia has almost ceased to exist as a state. The animosities fueling Somalia's conflict are based on clan affiliation and lust for power, not ideology. What authority exists is exercised by warlords, who battle one another. The population is at the mercy of desperate, hungry young militiamen--some not yet teenagers--who often double as bandits.
A new round of fighting between rival clan leaders--Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aideed--broke out in Mogadishu on November 17. Since then, as many as 6,000 people may have died and perhaps 15,000 have been wounded. Some estimates are that 90 percent of casualties are non-combatants and that, of these, 75 percent are children. The fighting continues, varying in intensity from day to day.
The most powerful group in central Somalia, the United Somali Congress (USC), seems to be destroying itself in the current fighting. The most powerful group in northern Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM), declared an independent "Somaliland Republic" last May, which none of the other factions nor any foreign countries have recognized. In the past month there has been significant intra-clan fighting in "Somaliland" as well. Northeastern Somalia appeared relatively calm until recently when a UNICEF doctor working there was murdered. In southwestern Somalia the ousted Siad Barre and his supporters form yet another faction. Siad's continued presence has discouraged humanitarian assistance to the region controlled by his forces.
Alarmed by the Somali catastrophe, former Secretary General Perez de Cuellar sent Under Secretary General James Jonah to Mogadishu in early January, to assess the situation and attempt to arrange safe passage for relief supplies and aid workers. General Aideed told Jonah that the fighting was none of the UN's business, although UN humanitarian aid would be welcome.
The U.S. Response
Throughout the crisis we have urged the factions to stop fighting and permit international relief operations to go forward. We have consulted with UN Security Council members; influential countries such as Italy, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; the OAU and others, about actions the international community could usefully take to promote peace and prevent famine.
On January 23, with U.S. support and as a result of Under Secretary General Jonah's report, the Security Council adopted Resolution 733 on the situation in Somalia. The resolution:
-- Urges an immediate cease fire.
-- Calls for the Secretary General, in cooperation with the OAU and the Arab League, to contact all the warring factions to seek their commitment to a cease fire permitting humanitarian assistance to be distributed.
-- Declares a general and complete arms embargo.
-- Calls for increased UN humanitarian assistance and asks the Secretary General to consider appointment of an international relief coordinator.
-- Urges all parties to assure the safety of humanitarian assistance personnel.
-- Calls upon all states and international organizations to contribute to the humanitarian relief effort.
-- Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.
UN Under Secretary General Jonah believes that humanitarian assistance on a serious scale is impossible without a cease fire. The problem is how to bring that about. In a conflict it takes more than one side to make peace.
The UN, the OAU and the Arab League are now looking at what can be done about the crisis in Somalia. Somalis and others have urged the United States simply to take the situation in hand and impose peace. We are sympathetic, but believe that such suggestions are unrealistic. While outsiders can facilitate contacts and offer good offices, these efforts will come to naught if the Somali leaders themselves refuse to lay down their arms and consider national rather than personal interests. We and others will continue to seek ways to persuade the Somalis to accept a cease fire.